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Disintermediation and the Role of Banks in Europe:  
An International Comparison 
January 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper presents an empirical analysis of the alledged transformation of the financial systems in 
the three major European economies, France, Germany and the UK. Based on a unified data set 
developed on the basis of national accounts statistics, and employing a new and consistent method 
of measurement, the following questions are addressed: Is there a common pattern of structural 
change; do banks lose importance in the process of change; and are the three financial systems 
becoming more similar? We find that there is neither a general trend towards disintermediation, 
nor towards a transformation from bank-based to capital market-based financial systems, nor for 
a loss of importance of banks. Only in the case of France strong signs of transformation as well as 
signs of a general decline in the role of banks could be found. Thus the three financial systems also 
do not seem to become more similar. However, there is also a common pattern of change:  the 
intermediation chains are lengthening in all three countries. Nonbank financial intermediaries are 
taking over a more important role as mobilizers of capital from the non-financial sectors. In 
combination with the trend towards securitization of bank liabilites, this change increases the 
funding costs of banks and may put banks under pressure. In the case of France, this change is so 
pronounced that it might even threaten the stability of the financial system. 
JEL-Classification: G 1, G 2,  
Keywords: bank-based financial systems, capital market-based financial systems,  
           (dis-)intermediation 
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Disintermediation and the Role of Banks in Europe 
An International Comparison  
1. Introduction 
Not too long ago, most economists did not consider the financial sector
1 of a country to be 
important for welfare and growth. In standard neoclassical theory, financial institutions hardly 
appear at all. This is not so much because they are simply left out, but rather because financial 
institutions and financial contracts do not have a legitimate place in the theoretical edifice of 
general equilibrium analysis. Almost the same can be said for growth theory in the traditions of 
Harrod/Domar and Solow/Swan.
2 In these theories "capital" is not "financial capital" but 
encompasses real assets or claims to real assets. Under the influence of the theoretical work of 
Joseph Stiglitz (e.g. 1985, 1993) and other proponents of a theory based on the economics of 
information and incentives, and the empirical work by King/Levine (1993) who build upon these 
foundations, hardly any economist would still question that "finance matters". As a consequence, 
academic economists, including those with a strong theoretical inclination, have devoted a great 
deal of attention to financial institutions, financial structure and the general design of financial 
systems.
3  
As banks are just one part of the financial sector, which also includes organized financial markets 
and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs), acknowledging that the financial sector and the 
financial system are important does not necessarily imply that banks, as a special type of financial 
institution, are also important. As Merton/Bodie (1995) and other adherents of a functional 
approach to finance argue, the institutional forms through which certain financial functions are 
executed may not be essential to the functions and might therefore change over time. 
When it comes to assessing the present roles and likely future prospects of banks as a special type 
of institution, opinions differ. Some observers consider banking to be a “declining industry”; the 
well-known banker Ulrich Cartelleri from Deutsche Bank predicted several years ago that they 
will be the steelmills and shipyards of the 1990s; and Miller (1997) proclaims "the obsolescence 
                                                 
1 Sometimes the terms “financial sector” and “financial system” are employed in an undiscriminating manner. 
In this paper we use the term “financial sector” for the totality of institutions which provide financial services 
to the non financial sectors of the economy, whereas the term ‘financial system’ designates the demand for 
and supply of financial services and the way in which, and the economic units by which, they are provided. 
Note that according to this definition not only financial intermediaries and markets, but also the patterns of 
saving and financing and aspects of corporate governance are part of the financial system of a country; see 
Schmidt/Tyrell (1997). 
2 See the overview in Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995). According to Levine (1997), the same even holds for the new 
growth theory in the style of Romer and Lucas, although there would not be a conceptual problem of 
integrating financial aspects into their models, as the article by Levine demonstrates in detail.  
3 For recent surveys see Thakor (1996), Boot/Thakor (1997), and Allen/Gale (1997), Chapter 1.  
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of commercial banking" as an unquestionable fact which only needs to be explained in an 
acceptable way. Others strongly disagree. Boyd and Gertler (1995) paraphrase Mark Twain in 
the title of their paper "Are Banks Dead?" and suggest what they see as the answer: "(The) 
Reports (are) Greatly Exaggerated"
4.  
The present paper seeks to make an empirical contribution to the discussion of the role of banks. 
Looking at the situation in the US, one can indeed get the impression that their role is fading.
5 As 
the American economy usually sets the pace for other countries, one might be inclined to think that 
a general process consisting of disintermediation, securitization, and an increase in the importance 
of non-bank financial intermediaries and financial markets has already lead, or will lead, to a 
general decline of banks in industrialized countries. 
Europe provides a particularly interesting testing ground for this proposition. The ongoing process 
of European financial integration, which started in the 1980s, has exposed the financial systems of 
the member countries to a wave of regulatory change. It is more likely in a time of change  than in 
a stable environment that economic forces which could alter the role of banks will indeed have a 
visible impact. Thus the financial systems of the three major European economies - France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom  - might exhibit the features of disintermediation and 
securitization mentioned above with the role of banks in these economies declining as a 
consequence.  
The present paper investigates whether there are common tendencies towards disintermediation 
and securitization in the three countries and whether they indicate, or may have lead to, a declining 
role of banks. As we will show, the answer to this general question is negative. On a country by 
country basis, however, the evidence is mixed. In addition, the paper focuses on problems of 
measurement. It develops and applies both a general framework and a specific method to 
measure the importance of banks. While mainly trying to derive substantive results, we also want 
to assess the method itself by asking how plausible the results of applying it appear in the light of 
additional information.  
To our knowledge, this is the first comparative study of Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom which analyses comparable data on disintermediation, securitization and the role of 
banks.
6 
                                                 
4 For a recent collection of articles supporting this view see the Winter 1996 issue of the Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance. 
5 See e.g. Greenbaum/Thakor (1995), last chapter. 
6 Country specific studies employing a similar approach are also rare. The first comparable study for the case 
of Germany has been published only weeks ago by Domanski (1997). The most relevant source for France is 
Plihon (1995). No similar study for the United Kingdom has come to our attention so far.  
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical background needed 
to show why banks might be important and how their importance can in principle be measured. 
The third section develops the method of measuring the importance of banks by defining ratios of 
intermediation and securitization which can shed light on their role. Section 4 contains four 
propositions concerning disintermediation and securitization and the role of banks in the three 
countries and evaluates them empirically on the basis of these ratios. The discussion of these 
propositions leads to a comparison of the development of the financial systems of the three 
countries. In addition, the section discusses briefly how reasonable our results appear in the light 
of additional information. Section 5 draws conclusions with respect to the importance of banks 
and as regards the limitations and merits of our method of measurement, and points out areas in 
which future work along the same lines would be useful.   
2. Theoretical Background: Why Banks Might be Important 
2.1 The Conventional Theory of Financial Intermediation 
A well known exception to the tradition in economic analysis of ignoring the role of the financial 
sector is the theory of financial intermediation of Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960). According to 
their view, banks are intermediaries which "go between" surplus and deficit units. They collect 
deposits from savers, typically households, and channel them to borrowers, typically the enterprise 
sector and the government. In the process of doing so, they transform the quality of capital with 
respect to lot sizes, maturities and risks. The explanation why banks exist follows directly from this 
function: Banks exist because, as intermediaries and transformers of capital, they are "productive"; 
they increase the social value of capital by enabling it to be put to more efficient use.  
In the analysis of Gurley and Shaw, the distinction between banks on the one side, and capital 
markets and NBFIs on the other side is not well developed. Indeed, Gurley and Shaw largely 
overlook the fact that under certain circumstances capital markets might be able to perform the 
functions of intermediation and transformation. The distinction between banks as monetary 
financial i ntermediaries and NBFIs does also not play an essential role in their analysis of the 
function of banks. Thus the explanation given for the existence of banks is implicitely based on the 
comparison between a situation in which the only intermediaries which exist are banks and a 
situation in which there is no financial sector at all and in which financing takes the forms of self-
financing or direct financing.
7 Despite this shortcoming, the conventional theory of financial 
intermediation provides a basis for  measuring the role of banks: The extent to which they 
                                                 
7 An indication of the tendency to set banks at a par with the entire financial sector is the wide-spread use of 
the ratio of money to GDP ("financial depth") as a measure of the quality or the state of development of a 
financial system (e.g. in Worldbank 1989).  
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intermediate capital provides insights about their importance. We shall use a concept of 
measurement which builds upon this idea. 
2.2 The New Theory of Financial Intermediation 
The new theory of financial intermediation, based on the work of Townsend (1979), 
Diamond/Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), Calomiris/Kahn (1991) and others, is much more 
explicit in analyzing what banks as a special type of intermediary can do better than financial 
markets and NBFIs, and it explains their existence by pointing out these specific strengths. We 
also use these insights for our empirical work. 
The individual models which make up this branch of the literature show that banks are financial 
intermediaries which can, under  specific conditions, solve  specific  information and incentive 
problems in the relationships with savers and investors in ways which are, in a specific sense, 
better than the way in which these problems could be solved either by direct financing or by 
financing via capital markets and/or NBFIs. Although each individual model is highly specific one 
can summarize the qualitative content of this line of research by saying that “banks are unique“ 
(James 1987). In fact, they are the specialists for the “difficult cases”: On their asset side they are 
particularly well suited to act as (delegated) monitors (Diamond 1984), and thus their special role 
can be seen in the financing of investment projects which capital markets would not be in a 
position to assess and to monitor. On their liability side, their special role derives from the fact that 
they provide liquidity to their clients and can commit themselves to do so even under adverse 
conditions. The function of providing a certain liquidity assurance to their clients is based on their 
role of taking deposits from their clients.  
Thus in trying to assess the importance of banks one should take a special look at the extent to 
which they rely on funding in the form of deposits and to which they grant loans which imply 
monitoring of their borrowers.
8 Although it may be difficult to measure these qualitatively special 
roles of banks, in our paper we nevertheless make an attempt to do it. 
2.3 Implications  
The implications of the theoretical considerations outlined above are straightforward. Both the 
conventional and the new theories of financial intermediation can be used as the theoretical 
background for our empirical work. Their „message“ can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
8 As Rajan (1996) has pointed out, there is also a functional relationship between the special roles of banks as 
monitoring lenders and as providers of liquidity. This not only indicates that the analysis of Gurley and Shaw 
is basically sound, but it also reinforces the point that “banks are unique “ in that they combine the two 
complementary activities.  
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A high level of financial intermediation performed by  banks, and in particular the 
transformation of deposits into loans which entail the monitoring of borrowers, and the 
qualitative transformation of capital indicate that banks play an important role. 
Disintermediation and, to a certain extent, the securitization of bank deposits and bank loans 
can be regarded as signs of a certain loss of importance on the part of banks.  
That banks may lose some of their importance as intermediaries should not be misunderstood to 
imply that the overall level of intermediation in a given economy declines too. As the „functional 
approach to finance“ (Merton/Bodie 1995) makes sufficiently clear, it may well be the case that a 
given function is taken over by other institutional forms. Nor would a decline of the role of banks 
as intermediaries necessarily indicate that the overall importance of banks declined, as they may 
take over or expand other functions at the same time.
9 
 
3. Measurement: Method and Data 
3.1 The Concept of Intermediation and Securitization Ratios 
The measurement of intermediation and securitization ratios is based on the concept of the 
economy as a set of sectors that interchange financial assets. Accumulated over time these 
financial flows translate into financial assets of one sector and an offsetting liability item of another 
sector. With the aggregation of financial flows over sectors, flows between entities that belong to 
the same sector are consolidated, so that, say, a bank’s loan to another bank or a liability of one 
non-financial company vis-à-vis another non-financial company are cancelled out. The following 
Table 1 is based on this flow-of-funds concept and shows the resulting accumulated and value-
adjusted financial assets for the German economy in 1996. The Figures are normalized so as to 
make the data easier to interpret. 
                                                 
9 For the sake of brevity, we shall not keep repeating these general reservations although they apply to most of 
what follows; see, however, section 4.3 below.  
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Table 1: German Sectors’ Financial Assets and Liabilites in 1996 (normalized) 
Entries in a given row indicate financial claims which the sector indicated on the left of the first 
column holds on each of the other sectors. These claims can either be securitized (sec.) or non-
securitized (n. sec.). Correspondingly, cells in a given column indicate where the financing of the 
sector in the top row comes from. The cells on the diagonal would indicate intra-sectoral claims 
and liabilities; but they are not contained in the matrix of intersectoral claims.  
It is evident that some sectors, notably households, are on average surplus units while others, 
notably the non-financial (nf.) companies and the public sector, comprise of deficit units. The 
financial sector, which subdivides here into two subsectors, namely banks and NBFIs, is 
characterized by an approximately balanced financial account.  
Intermediation ratios (IR) and securitization ratios (SR) of non-financial sectors can be computed 
directly from data like those in Table 1. Whereas IRs take a sectoral/institutional perspective 
and indicate what portion of total financial assets (liabilities) of non-financial sectors is channeled 
to (from) financial intermediaries as opposed to claims on (from) other non-financial sectors, SRs 
take an instrumental perspective and answer the question: What portion of a given class of total 
financial claims (liabilities) of non-financial sectors is held (owed) in securitized form?
10 
The Asset-IR of all Non-Financial Sectors
11 indicates what fraction of total financial claims of the 
non-financial sectors on all other sectors are claims on the two financial subsectors. In Table 1 it 
                                                 
10 Following standard notions, we treat stocks, bonds, notes, money market instruments, investment 
certificates, and certificates of deposits as securities. 
11 In the remainder of the paper we will use capital letters when referring to the specific intermediation ratios 
and securitization ratios definded here. 
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 6b
Liabs. Households nf. Companies Public Sector RoW Banks NBFI Sum
Assets sec. n. sec. sec. n. sec. sec. n. sec. sec. n. sec. sec. n. sec. sec. n. sec.
1 Households - - 11 15 15 0 9 2 24 106 20 67 270
2 nf. Companies 0 0 - - 3 0 4 40 9 48 11 0 113
3 Public Sector 0 0 2 0 - - 0 10 1 17 1 0 32
4 RoW 0 0 6 23 18 5 - - 27 44 2 0 126
5 Banks 0 94 9 98 24 48 9 45 - - 13 0 340
6 NBFI 0 21 15 6 14 2 6 1 21 34 - - 119
Sum 0 116 44 143 73 55 28 98 81 248 46 68 1000
116 186 128 126 329 114   
10 
 
can be computed by dividing the sum of rows 1-4 in column 5a-6b by the total sum of rows 1-4. 
The Liability-IR of all Non-Financial Sectors, on the other hand, indicates what fraction of all 
liabilites of the non-financial sectors are owed to the financial sector. It is calculated by first 
summing over rows 5 and 6 in columns 1a-4b and then dividing the result by the total sums in 
these columns.
12 
As the financial account of the financial sector is approximately balanced, the Liability-IR of all 
non-financial sectors and the corresponding Asset-IR should be roughly equal.
 This is indeed the 
case for the data in the table above:
13 both ratios work out at 70%.
14 More than two thirds of the 
claims of the non-financial sectors are thus held against banks and NBFIs, and less than a third are 
consisting of direct claims on other sectors. 
SRs of non-financial sectors focus on the type of their assets and liabilities and are computed 
analogously to IRs. They indicate the portion of a given class of assets and liabilities, respectively, 
that are securitized. Summing over columns 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a in rows 1-4 and dividing by 
the total sum of these rows yields the Asset-SR of all Non-Financial Sectors. The Liability-SR of 
all Non-Financial Sectors equals the sum of rows 1-6 in columns 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a over the total 
sum of columns 1a to 4b. In the case of the SRs, the equality of asset side and liability side does 
not necessarily hold because the financial sector may have more securities on either of the two 
sides of its account. In 1996 the German non-financial sectors’ Asset-SR was larger than their 
Liability-SR (30% compared to 26%). 
Apparently, Table 1 also lends itself to the computation of partial IRs and SRs. For example, the 
Asset-IR of Households (80%) indicates the extent to which households’ financial assets consist 
of claims against financial intermediaries. This ratio can be further broken down into the Asset-IR 
of Households with Banks (48%), which specifies the proportion of bank liabilities in the 
households’ financial portfolio, and the Asset-IR of Households with NBFIs (32%). 
The set of liability ratios of non-financial companies are also of particular interest. The relative 
amount of funds provided by banks is given by the Liability-IR of Non-Financial Companies with 
Banks (54%), while the proportion of securities in all liabilities is reflected by the Liability-SR of 
Non-Financial Companies (24%). 
We have so far discussed ratios pertaining to the non-financial sectors. However, the concept of 
IRs and SRs can also be applied to the financial sector itself and to its two components. For 
                                                 
12 Refer to the appendix for a graphical representation of the calculation of these ratios. 
13 The equality also approximately holds for our entire data set. 
14 This as well as similar Figures which follow in this section refer to Table 1 above describing the case of 
Germany in the year 1996.   
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example, the Liability-SR of Banks (25%) illustrates the degree to which banks rely on securities 
to fund their operations. The Liability-IR of Banks (17%) indicates the proportion of funds which 
banks obtain from other types of intermediaries, i.e. from NBFIs, and thus measures the length of 
the financial intermediation chain in an economy. This particular ratio exemplifies one of the 
strengths of our concept: Ratios like ”Financial Sector Assets over Total Financial Assets of the 
Economy” that are frequently employed to describe the importance of the financial sector in a 
given country may be misleading because they double-count intra-financial-sector claims. For this 
as well as other reasons they are not well suited to indicate whether the roles of financial 
intermediaries differ across countries and over time.  
It should be clear by now that the concepts of measurement utilized in the remainder of this paper 
have a theoretical background and are defined in a consistent manner. As we shall see later, they 
can be employed to formulate and test powerful statements about investment and funding patterns 
of the various sectors in a given economy. 
3.2 The Data 
This section describes important aspects and problems pertaining to the coverage and 
construction of our data set. The problems have to be kept in mind when drawing conclusions 
from the empirical results.
15 
National account statistics compiled by national statistical offices or central banks are a data 
source which lends itself almost naturally to our type of analysis. Table 2 shows the sources for 
our three-country study. The data series start in the early eighties in order to cover the period of 
far-reaching deregulation and liberalization in France and the United Kingdom in the mid eighties 
and reach out as far into the present as data are available to us. 
Table 2: Sources for National Accounts Data 
Germany  1982-1996  Deutsche Bundesbank: Ergebnisse der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Finanzierungsrechnung für Deutschland 
France  1981-1994  Banque de France: Tableau des opérations financières 
United Kingdom  1982-1995  Central Statistical Office, Financial Statistics (The Blue Book) 
The accounts contain financial assets and liabilities of an economy’s sectors on both a flow and a 
stock basis.
16 Although there is an agreed standard for their construction, a comparison of 
                                                 
15 See also Corbett/Jenkinson (1996) who discuss the suitability of national accounts data for measuring the 
financing behavior of firms over time and across countries. 
16 We have computed IRs and SRs on both bases. In this paper we only present those based on stocks 
because they are less erratic and thus better suited to illustrate and compare trends that develop over a longer  
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indicators based on national account statistics from different countries must invariably deal with 
divergent i) definitions of sectors, ii) inclusions of items and iii) degrees of intra-sector 
consolidation. Consequently, we had to adjust the data in these three respects in order to arrive at 
a truly comparable data set with consistent sector and item definitions. It will become clear, 
however, that some international differences could not be eliminated. 
(i) The most prominent example of international data differences concerns the definition of the 
sector of non-financial companies. Whereas the German sector account also covers 
unincorporated enterprises and partnerships, both the French and the British statistics include 
these enterprises in the household sector account. The liability ratios for non-financial companies 
of the latter two countries are thus biased towards the financing patterns of big companies and 
corporations. A second complication arises from the disparate treatment of public enterprises. For 
Germany and France they could be included in the companies’ sector; the data for the United 
Kingdom did not allow this. As a consequence the privatization waves in the latter two countries 
bear differently on the respective ratios.   
Adjustments of sector definitions were also necessary with respect to the financial sector. For the 
United Kingdom we included building societies in the banking sector since many of these 
institutions changed their status during our observation period. Specific items originally recorded in 
the public sector, e.g. selected activities of the treasury and the postal bank organization, have 
been included into the French banking sector. Due to the existence of country-specific institutional 
forms and functions of NBFIs, their sector is not perfectly homogenous across countries, either. In 
this case we have not made adjustments.
17 
(ii)  The second group of differences in data construction concerns the inclusion of specific asset 
and liability items, particularly trade credits. The French accounts specify trade credits for each 
sector on an unconsolidated basis. The accounts for the United Kingdom consolidate trade credits 
but neither record them for the household sector nor for small companies. Finally, the German 
accounts only provide information on foreign trade credits. As a consequence, we only consider 
foreign trade credit for all three countries. For France, where trade credit has traditionally been an 
essential means of direct financing between all types of companies, this ommission tends to 
exaggerate the intermediation ratios and securitization ratios relative to the other two countries. 
                                                                                                                                                     
period of time. The drawback of stock-based data for securities - namely, that no distinction is made between 
changes in value and actual additions to or deductions from the sector accounts - has been found to have no 
fundamental implications for our main results. 
17 Pension funds represent an important type of NBFI in the United Kingdom, whereas they are almost 
unknown as a separate type of institution in Germany and France. This is of course due to the specific nature 
of the Anglo-Saxon pension system. For France we included those financial accounts of the public sector that 
are attributable to the social security system into the NBFI sector.  
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(iii) As with trade credits, the degree of consolidation also differs with respect to other items, 
particularly securities. The British Central Statistical Office reports all items only after intra-
sectoral consolidation. Because we are mainly interested in inter-sectoral claims, this in fact suits 
our purposes. However, since quite a few items are reported separately for the subsectors of the 
public sector, namely public companies, local authorities, and the central government, 
inconsistencies may result from non-adjustable flows between these entities. In contrast, the 
French and the German central banks do not consolidate securities. Hence, we had to neutralize 
these claims. When we tried to do this, we encountered a problem that securities have in common 
with a number of other items in all national accounts. In some instances, the construction of the 
statistics does not permit one to directly determine the other sector on which a specific claim is 
held or to which a specific liability is owed. An example may help to illustrate the problem: 
Assume that in a given year the household sector owns 100 units in bonds. No information is 
provided concerning the issuers of these securities. However, from the liability-side data for all 
other sectors we know their respective weights in the market value of total bonds outstanding in 
that particular year. We thus had to make a simple, but inevitably crude, assumption to attribute 
the households’ bonds to the various other sectors: We assume that the bond portfolio of 
households is composed exactly like the portfolio of all bonds outstanding in the respective 
economy. Extending this assumption to all sectors amounts to postulating that all sectors hold in 
their portfolio the same portion of bonds issued by banks, insurance companies, non-financial 
companies, etc. Due to the lack of detailed information we had to apply this method to all types of 
securities (bonds, equity, commercial paper, money market instruments) for all three countries, to 
the item ”miscellaneous instruments” for the United Kingdom, and to the items ”other assets” and 
”other liabilities” for Germany. 
Again, all of these difficulties have to be borne in mind when we want to interpret the ratios 
computed in a meaningful way. Our experiences in dealing with the data, however, revealed that 
they primarily affect the levels of the ratios and not so much their changes over time. 
 
4. Propositions and Empirical Results 
4.1 Overview  
In this section, we develop and test four propositions or hypotheses about changes in the financial 
systems which should have implications for judging how the role of banks may have changed in 
recent years. The four propositions differ in several respects: 
(1) While the first three are based on notions which one hears frequently from economists and 
practitioners from the financial industry when they discuss structural changes in the financial  
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systems of industrialized countries, and turn out not to be correct, the fourth proposition, which is 
better supported by the data, is not a standard claim of the "educated public". 
(2) While the first two propositions, which are discussed in subsection 4.2, are general in that they 
refer to disintermediation and securitization at the level of the entire financial systems, permitting, 
however, to draw at least tentative conclusions about changes in the role of (commercial) banks, 
the third and fourth propositions, which we will present in subsection 4.3, address the role of 
(commercial) banks directly. 
(3) As far as possible, we shall attempt to formulate our hypotheses in such a way that we can test 
their validity with our intermediation and securitization ratios. In the process of developing and 
testing the four propositions, we will employ ratios which are partial ratios with increasing degrees 
of differentiation as explained in section 3.1 above.    
In order to motivate our discussion of the four propositions and to facilitate the understanding of 
the logical sequence which underlies their presentation, we employ the same graphical model of 
financial intermediation and apply it with increasing degrees of sophistication. 
4.2 General Propositions  
Proposition 1: There is a general tendency towards disintermediation.  
This simple and general proposition can be tested with the overall intermediation ratios of assets 
and/or of liabilities for the totality of the non-financial sectors vis-à-vis the entire financial sector. 
Figures I.a and I.b on the following page show that these intermediation ratios do not fall in all 
three countries: The proposition is clearly not valid for the case of Germany and the United 
Kingdom. In both countries, the overall intermediation ratios are almost constant, and the ratios 
are almost equally high. In France, on the other hand, there is a substantial decline of the 
intermediation ratio; and this decline is also relatively continuous over the observation period. 
As households are the major surplus sector, we also analyze the partial Asset-IRs of 
Households
18 (Figure I.c on the next page). Between countries and over time these ratios indicate 
the same pattern as is shown by the overall intermediation ratios. As non-financial companies are a 
particularly important deficit sector, we also look at the Liability-IRs of the Company sector vis-à-
vis the entire financial sector (Figure I.d). Here again, we observe the same pattern: The ratios of 
German and British non-financial companies are not decreasing, in fact, they are increasing to a 
                                                 
18 We remind the reader of the convention to use abbreviations and capital letters when we refer to the ratios 
explicitly defined in section 3.  
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remarkabe extent. In France, the decline in the ratio turns out to be even more pronounced when 
compared to the overall intemediation ratio. 
Thus the first proposition can be clearly rejected for Germany and the United Kingdom, and thus 
also as a general proposition, while it can be accepted in the case of France.  
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In order to lay the groundwork for the comparison with the following propositions, we shall briefly 
explain why one might be inclined to think that an overall 
disintermediation could indicate a decreasing importance of 
banks, and why such a conclusion would not be warranted. 
Those who regard an alledged tendency towards overall 
disintermediation as an indication of a declining importance of 
banks seem to have the following simple model (Diagram 1) 
of an economy in mind. In this diagram, as well as in those 
which follow, capital letters indicate the different stocks of 
claims and liabilites and the flows from which they have resulted. 
A process of disintermediation could be characterized by a switch of financial „flows“ from the 
channel C&E, which leads through the banks, on the right in 
Diagram 1 to channel A on the left. What this over-simplified 
model overlooks is that the financial sector also includes the 
subsector of NBFIs. Therefore, a constant intermediation 
ratio as in the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom 
could also be consistent with a shift from intermediation by 
banks to intermediation by NBFIs and thus a decreasing role 
of banks.
19 In the extended graphical model of Diagram 2, 
this possibility could be represented by a shift from channel C&E to channel B&D. 
In the literature, disintermediation and securitization are not always carefully distinguished.
20 
Occasionally, the two terms are even used synonymously. Like disintermediation, securitization is 
considered a feature of modern financial systems. Thus, we shall now investigate 
Proposition 2: There is a general tendency of securitization. 
This proposition cannot be rejected on the basis of the data, as can be seen in Figures II on the 
page 17. The  Asset-SR of all Non-Financial Sectors (Figure II.a) shows strong growth for 
France, only a modest increase in Germany, and almost no change in the United Kingdom. As a 
consequence, the difference in levels for the United Kingdom and Germany on the one hand, and 
that for France on the other, becomes more pronounced. An almost identical trend is reflected in 
the Asset-SR of Households (Figure II.c) for all three countries: French, German, and, to a lesser 
                                                 
19 And conversely, it is not possible in principle to derive a declining role of banks from a declining overall 
intermediation ratio, as the intermediation by NBFIs might decline more; however, as an empirical fact this is 
not relevant in what this paper discusses.  
20 See e.g. OECD (1995) and for a clear discussion of this “nebulous term” Berlin (1992), or Frankel (1993) and 
the critical comment by J. Holtcroft. 
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extent, British households as well invest an increasing portion of their financial portfolio in 
securities. 
A look at the Liability-SRs of all Non-Financial Sectors (Figure II.b) reveals a general trend 
towards securitisation. It is interesting to note that, in terms of securitization, the financing patterns 
of the totality of Brititsh non-financial sectors seem to have changed more than their investment 
behavior. This is probably due to the increasing involvement of pension funds and life assurance 
companies as the liabilities of these NBFIs mainly consists of unsecuritized claims held by 
households, whereas the majority of their assets are bonds and stocks. The extremely high 
(especially when compared to the other two countries) Liability-SR of Non-Financial Companies 
in the United Kingdom is an empirical manifestation of the theoretical notion of a market-based 
financial system. Large British companies have traditionally met their external financing needs via 
the capital markets, and they seem to be doing this to an increasing extent.
21 
The low Liability-SRs in the German financial system clearly depict one facet of what economists 
circumscribe with the term “bank-based financial system”. Non-financial companies rely on capital 
markets as a means of financing to an almost insignificant extent (Figure II.d): They have been 
satisfying less than ten percent of their external  - and intersectoral  - financing needs through 
securities issues. The considerable increase in the overall Liability-SR after 1991 can be attributed 
to the German reunification, which greatly increased the financing needs of the public sector.  
The French non-financial sectors, and in particular the non-financial companies, show an increase 
in their financing via securities, particularly during the early eighties. The French trend towards 
securitization, both on the asset and the liability side of the non-financial sectors, might indicate that 
France is changing from a bank-based to a market-based financial system.  
                                                 
21 The marked difference in levels between the Liability-SRs of Non-Financial Sectors and that of non-financial 
companies can be mainly explained by the financing patterns of the “overseas sector“. They are characterized 
by non-securitized interbank operations of  foreign financial institutions, which depress the overall SR, 
because, as was explained in section 3.2 above, foreign banks are counted as part of the foreign sector, and 
thus as a non-financial sector, in the official British statistics.              
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What could be the intuition behind considering an increase in the securitization ratio as an indicator 
of a declining importance of banks? A simple explanation would recur to Diagram 1 in combination 
with the assumptions that direct financing is largely securitized, while the liabilities of banks are 
mainly deposits and their assets are mainly loans. Thus, in this "model" disintermediation and 
securitization would be one and the same thing, and therefore securitization ratios would not add 
information to that contained in the intermediation ratios.  
A somewhat more subtle interpretation would be based on Diagram 2, again in combination with the 
assumption that the assets and liabilites of NBFIs are more likely to be securitized than those of 
banks.
22 In this interpretation, an increase in the securitization ratios is an indicator of a declining role 
of banks. As this is not the same thing as a declining overall intermediation ratio, there is a good 
reason to look at the interaction of the two types of ratios, as we shall do in the next section. 
4.3 Specific Propositions about the Role of Banks 
We now turn to two propositions which address the role of banks directly, which are based on 
specific forms of interaction between intermediation and securitization ratios, and which make use of 
partial intermediation and securitization ratios.  
The relevant literature contains some quite bold propositions about the development of financial 
systems. One such proposition is that banking is a "declining industry". A seemingly different 
proposition is that financial systems tend to develop "naturally" from being old-fashioned and bank-
based to being more advanced and capital market-based. The new CEO of Deutsche Bank, Mr. 
Breuer, seems to see this as the likely future and to regard it more as a chance than as a threat to his 
bank. Rybczynski (1984) is a standard source for the same view in the academic literature. In fact, 
except for the emotional overtones, these two propositions need not be in contrast because a shift of 
financial activity to "the capital markets" would also imply a shift away from traditional banking as 
intermediation. This leads us to our third proposition: 
Proposition 3: Financial systems become more capital market-based and less bank-based; 
and/or banking is a declining industry. 
                                                 
22 Thus, a closed end investment fund would be the prototypical NBFI. Note that this assumption is not true in 
the case of the United Kingdom because of the role of pension funds, as explained above.   
21 
The  - not very explicit - empirical basis for the claim that (commercial) banking is a declining 
industry or that financial systems are becoming "more modern" is the belief that there are tendencies 
towards both disintermediation and securitization at an overall level.  
Using the results derived in the discussions of propositions 1 and 2 above, one cannot, on the basis 
of the alledged association with disintermediation and securitization as potential causal factors, 
expect that banks are losing importance in Germany, simply because overall intermediation is not on 
the decline in this country. There should also not be much change in the United Kingdom because 
the British system has already been "capital-market based" for a long time. In France, in contrast, 
banks could indeed be declining and/or the entire French financial system could be in the process of 
transforming itself from a German-style bank-based system to a UK-style capital market-based one 
as intermediation declines and securitization rises in general. These claims fit the facts quite well. So 
the first evidence concerning proposition 3 is negative: if it were a valid general statement, it would 
have to hold for Germany, too. 
The traditional discussion of the decline/structural change hypothesis is beset with several 
weaknesses. One is that it does not make enough use of specific data on disintermediation and 
securitization; another one is that it does not measure the result of the combined effect of 
disintermediation and securitization in a manner which uses consistent measurement concepts. The 
third and possibly most serious shortcoming is that it is based on an all too vague idea about how 
disintermediation and securitization "affect" the role of banks. Therefore we want to find out whether 
our data allows us to say more and in particular to address the role of banks and its change directly. 
What indicators of the decline in the "importance" of banks or, alternatively, of the transition to a 
"more modern" financial system can be used?  
According to the traditional theory of financial intermediation discussed in section 2.1, an indicator of 
the importance of banks is the extent to which they act as intermediaries, i.e. the extent to which 
savers entrust their money to them and the extent to which they channel these funds to deficit 
sectors, notably the companies. A straightforward measure of this is the partial Asset-IR of all 
Non-Financial Sectors with Banks and the partial Liability IR of all Non-Financial Sectors with 
Banks (Figures III.a and III.b). As was explained above in the context of proposition 2, information 
about total securitization ratios can complement the information contained in the (changes in) the 
intermediation ratios.  
A second indicator of the importance of banks, which is motivated by the new theory of financial 
intermediation addressed in section 2.2 above, refers to the "quality" of bank services to the non-
financial sectors. One of these services is the provision of liquidity, and the other is monitoring the 
use of capital. At least an indication of the extent to which these core functions of banks are indeed  
22 
being performed by the banks can be obtained from the contracts which they have on the asset and 
liability sides of their balance sheets. In the light of the new theory of financial intermediation, a highly 
securitized bank appears to be less socially valuable or, in other words, more of an investment fund 
and less of a "genuine" bank (Rajan 1996). The relevant data to be looked at is (a) the Asset-IRs of 
all Non-Financial Sectors with Banks; (b) the Liability-IR of all Non-Financial Sectors to Banks; 
(c) the partial Asset IR of Households with Banks; and (d) the partial Liability-IR of non-financial 
companies vis-á-vis banks.  
(a) The Asset-IRs of all Non-Financial Sectors with Banks are shown in Figure III.a. on the next 
page. In a marked contrast to the overall asset intermedition ratios, these partial ratios decline in 
all three countries, though the decline is strongest in France (from 50% in 1982 to 31% in 1994), 
quite strong in the United Kingdom (from 46% to 35%) and only moderate in Germany (from 
55% to 51%). These ratios indicate that the role of banks as intermediaries indeed seems to have 
declined relative to NBFIs. 
(b) The proportion of liabilites of all non-financial sectors with banks as a percentage of all liabilites 
of all non-financial sectors is shown in Figure III.b. This ratio declines in the cases of France and 
the United Kingdom and remains stable in the case of Germany.  
(c) The partial Asset IRs of Households with Banks are shown in Figure III.c. They exhibit the same 
pattern of change as the overall Asset-IRs with Banks. It is interesting to note that the level of the 
partial asset intermediation ratio is by far the lowest (over the course of time) in Britain. This 
indicates that the role of banks as collectors of funds from households has always been more 
limited there than in Germany. The decline of this ratio in the French case indicates not only a 
strong trend of "débancarisation" (Faugère/Voisin 1994) but also a change from the German to 
the British model.  
(d) The partial Liability-IRs of Non-Financial Companies to Banks shown in Figure III.d. This ratio 
increases in Germany, declines - though not persistently - in the United Kingdom, but falls sharply 
in France. The cross-country difference in levels is quite striking; but to a certain extent it is 
merely a consequence of different sector and item definitions pointed out in section 3.2. Germany 
has the highest ratio, the United Kingdom by far the lowest. The ratio for France lies in between, 
but shows a trend from a level close to that of Germany in 1982 to the British level in the mid-
1990s.          
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One can summarize these findings like this: The intermediation ratios of the real sectors with 
respect to banks are clearly declining in the case of France, somewhat declining in the case of the 
United Kingdom and stable in the case of Germany. The decline is more pronounced in the cases 
of the Asset-IRs than in the case of the Liability-IRs. We shall come back to this interesting fact in 
the following subsection.  
The general, though certainly neither universal nor homogenous, trend towards disintermediation at 
the level of banks  - as measured from the perspective of the non-financial sectors - is 
supported by a general trend in all countries towards more securitization. The various 
securitization rates show the same general pattern between countries and between asset and 
liability-securitization ratios as the intermediation ratios. Thus the securitization ratios confirm the 
overall picture: The role of banks as intermediaries seems to decline strongly in France, hardly at 
all in Germany, and moderately in the United Kingdom; and the trend towards a reduced role of 
banks is stronger in the case of the funding of banks than of the financing by banks.  
How do these obervations fit together, and to what extent do they confirm the simple story of a 
decline of banks as a consequence, or a corrollary, of disintermediation and securitization? It 
seems that using those intermediation and securitization ratios which we have employed so far, i.e. 
those derived from the total assets and liability positions of the non-financial sectors and not of the 
banking sector - does not support the proposition of a general loss of importance of banks or, 
alternatively, of a structural change in the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom. However, 
for the case of France the proposition can be upheld. In France, the role of banks has decreased 
dramatically on both sides of the balance sheet, while in Germany and the United Kingdom there 
is only a moderate decline of the fraction of the financial assets of the non-financial sectors held in 
the form of claims on banks.  
Thus, although the differences between the three countries are interesting in themselves, we have 
so far failed to find what we have been looking for, namely a common pattern of the development 
of all three financial systems. The following constitutes a, possibly more fruitful, attempt to 
discover such a pattern. 
If one uses Diagram 2, the argument presented so far, and also the conventional story of the 
decline of banking or of structural change of financial systems, rests on the implicit assumption that 
the three channels A, B&D and C&E are isolated from each other. A shift of financial flows from 
C&E to B&D and A, as has clearly happened in France though not in Germany, at the same time 
represents a shift from a bank-based to a capital market-based financial system and a decline of 
banking.  
25 
However, there is one reason to doubt whether this is really the true - at least whether it is the 
most interesting - story which the data tells about structural change in the financial systems of the 
three countries. By their very construction, the various intermediation ratios are not independent of 
each other. What the non-financial sectors hold as claims (A+B+C) and what they owe (A+D+E) 
must be the same, and what the financial sector owes the non-financial sectors (B+C) must be the 
same as its total claims on the non-financial sectors (D+E). If the three channels are  not 
connected, then it must also be the case that B equals D, and the claims on banks (C) must equal 
the claims of banks (E). Statistical problems may be reasons why these identities do not hold 
precisely. But they cannot cause wide discrepancies. If the asset-intermediation ratio of all non-
financial sectors with banks (C) differs substantially from the liability-intermediation ratio to banks 
then this is evidence that the assumption of the three channels A, B&D and C&E being isolated 
from each other cannot be valid. As can be seen from Figures III.a and III.b, these rates do differ. 
And in fact, the differences in these ratios are shown to increase considerably over time in 
Germany and France, whereas in the United Kingdom it has been considerable for the entire 
observation period. 
The consequence of this is that the banks lend out more to the non-financial sectors than they 
collect from them. Such a difference requires that banks are able to substitute a shortfall in funding 
from the non-financial sectors by funding from other sources, which will necessarily be the NBFIs. 
This observation suggests an alternative hypothesis about structural change: 
Proposition 4: Only, or primarily, the role of banks as mobilizers of savings from the non-
financial sectors is declining.  
In section 3, we defined intermediation ratios of banks on their liability side and on their asset 
side, which have not been used in the discussion up to now. They tell us what fraction of bank 
funds comes from, or goes to, NBFIs respectively and thus demonstrate more clearly what the 
different levels of the ratios employed so far merely suggest: To a considerable extent - and more 
so in France and the United Kingdom than in Germany - banks have changed the composition of 
their funding (see Figure IV.a on the next page). While NBFIs are important on the liability side of 
banks, in none of the three countries do banks invest to a large extent in NBFIs.          
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The NBFIs which have become an important source of funds for the banks and at the same time 
important collectors of savings are primarily the investment funds including the OPCVM à court terme 
(somewhat similar to money market funds) in France and the pension funds in the United Kingdom 
(Davis, 1996). 
By using a third version of the graphical intermediation model, the change called for by the fourth 
proposition can be illustrated as in Diagram 3: The channel F from the subsector of NBFIs to banks 
has greatly gained in importance in France and also in Britain 
and in Germany.  
The chains of intermediation have become longer, especially in 
France and in the United Kingdom, over the observation 
period. This may be a more important change in the financial 
systems especially in France and the United Kingdom than 
what the conventional story t ells us, and it has far-reaching 
implications not only for the role of banks but also for their 
stabilty.  
One implication refers to the roles of banks. Especially in France and the United Kingdom, but also in 
Germany, they seem to have altered the focus of their activity vis-à-vis the non-financial sectors. In 
contrast to the more balanced position between savers and borrowers which they had in the past, they 
are now relatively more active as lenders, and thus probably also as monitors of borrowers, than as 
mobilizers of savings. To a certain extent this indicates a specialization of functions between banks and 
NBFIs: NBFIs have taken over a part of the role of collectors of savings; and they pass on an 
important fraction of the savings which they collect, to the banks as the "lending specialists". This 
development is not equally strong in all three countries, but it is present in each of them. We cannot go 
so far as to say that this is the only, or even the main development in France; but it is certainly an 
important development which complements those changes which point to a decrease in the general 
level of the intermediation activity of French banks and perhaps also to a loss of their overall 
importance.  
Referring back to the new theory of financial intermediation, one can ask whether the lengthening of the 
chain of intermediation and the reduced role of banks as mobilizers of capital indicates declining role in 
terms of the functions of banks. While their role as lenders to those borrowers who may require close 
monitoring does not decline as a consequence of this structural change, there could be a reduction of 
their role as providers of liquidity. However, it is not at all clear whether the extent to which this 
function is being performed by banks can really be measured by the level of their aggregate deposits; 
and the change in deposit-taking may be an even more imperfect indicator of a change in the supply. It 
Banks
NBFIs
Deficit Units (NFCs)
Surplus Units (HHs)
E D
F C B A
 
Diagram 3  
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may well be that the amount and the quality of information which banks have about their clients, the 
duration of the individual bank-customer relationships, the macro-economic regime and other factors 
are more important determinants of the provision of liquidity to clients by the respective banking 
system than the amount of aggregate bank deposits. So it appears to be at least possible that this 
function is not performed to a lesser extent despite the decrease in banks’ relative importance as 
deposit-taking institutions. 
However, there is a further aspect which deserves attention. Based on recent work by Allen/Gale 
(1995, 1997) one can ask what the change of the patterns of asset holdings by households implies for 
the inter-temporal risk smoothing function of the respective financial system, given that a large fraction 
of the funds invested by the non-financial sectors in NBFIs are  - either formally or de facto - 
securitized. If we wish to fully appreciate the possible implications of this change for performance of 
this function, we should also bear in mind that in all three countries the Liability-SR of Banks has 
increased over time (see also Figure IV.c), as has the direct holding of securities (Davis 1996, Berglöf 
1996). Thus, an increasing fraction of the wealth of households is now exposed to price risk. This may 
have the effect that changes in security values are not dampened as much now as they were in the past 
by the banking system. Seen in this light, European banks may now be performing the socially valuable 
function of absorbing intertemporal risk to a lesser extent than they did in the past. 
The second important implication refers to the profitability situation of the banks and thus perhaps also 
to their stability. In terms of funding costs for banks, the increasing securitization of bank liabilities and 
the increasing reliance of banks on NBFIs as a source of funds have a similar effect of obliging banks 
to pay more "market-like" rates of interest for their funds to the saving public, and this may endanger 
their profitability. If we combine the securitized portions of bank funds from the non-financial sectors 
and the funds which flow to the banks through the channel of the NBFIs, then we can assess this cost 
pressure. The aggregated effect of increasing bank costs is, again, strongest in the case of the French 
banking sector, and therefore the French banks are most likely to suffer from profitability problems. 
This is indeed the case, as we shall discuss below.  
We want to summarize the discussion of the fourth proposition as follows. Structural change in 
European financial systems is perhaps r eflected not so much in a general tendency towards 
"modernization" in the sense of a move towards a UK-style financial system in which capital markets 
play a more important role in general and the importance of banks (as intermediaries) is more limited, 
but rather in the fact that to an increasing extent banks are being substituted by NBFIs in their role as 
mobilizers of deposits. This development indicates that the degree of functional specialization in the 
financial systems is increasing. In combination w ith the trend to substitute bank deposits by bank 
securities, the process of having NBFIs as intermediaries between the public and banks may put the  
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banking sector under pressure. This may increase social welfare in the medium- to long term, but it 
may also endanger the stability of financial systems and thereby cause negative welfare effects.  
4.4 Supplementary Evidence on the Changing Role of Banks 
Given the way in which intermediation and securitization ratios are constructed, the nature of the 
conceptual framework selected, which is based on these rates, restricts the assessment of a change in 
the role of banks to a purely quantitative analysis of financial assets in the three economies. This 
subsection discusses the results of other empirical studies which take a different, more qualitatively 
oriented, perspective and interprets their results with respect to the issues discussed in subsection 4.3. 
It is our goal here to find evidence that helps us to better distinguish between mere structural changes 
and an actual decline of banking as an industry in the three countries for which data is analyzed, and 
particularly in France, and to understand the - possibly different - roles which banks have in the three 
countries. 
Closely related to investigations which, like the present one, analyze national accounts data are studies 
that are based on actual balance sheets and income statements provided by the banks themselves.
23 
Domanski (1997) and Plihon (1995) examine balance sheets of German banks and French banks, 
respectively, and arrive at results which are very similar to our own: Both the ratio of loans to total 
assets and the ratio of non-bank deposits to total assets of German banks have remained nearly stable 
while the corresponding ratios for French banks have fallen dramatically: for France, the ratio of loans 
to total assets dropped from 84% in1980 to 55% 1993 and the ratio of non-bank deposits to total 
assets fell from 73% in 1980 to 35% in 1993. During the same period, the share of securities in total 
bank liabilities shot up from 6% to 56% in France. From the OECD Bank Profitability Statistics 
(OECD 1994, 1996) we know that the corresponding ratios for British banks are as low as those 
calculated for their German counterparts, and also that they have not increased much.  
This data source also provides information on the composition of income for larger commercial banks 
in the three countries (see Figure IV.c). Non-interest income has increased in all countries relative to 
interest income. Since this trend is much more pronounced in the case of France than for the other two 
countries, one might conclude that investment banking activities have supplanted traditional 
intermediation activities to a large extent there. However, if one considers the steep decline in 
profitability as measured by total income over total assets, this change in income composition seems to 
have been accompanied by  - or even outweighed by - an extreme depression of the interest rate 
income of French banks. If the data for German and British banks is interpreted in a similar fashion, the 
picture that emerges would seem to suggest that the roles they have traditionally played in their 
                                                 
23 Of course, bank balance sheets are one of the sources of data used to compile national accounts statistics. 
However, the latter are only provided on a consolidated basis and also do not provide information on the income of 
banks.  
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respective financial system have been eroded to a much smaller extent. Furthermore, a comparison of 
the levels of the ratios in Figures IV.c and IV.d for the three countries in the early 1980s suggests that 
the traditional roles were quite different right from the outset. 
In summary, this piece of additional evidence backs up and extends our own results in so far as the 
proposition that banks are a declining industry seems to be wrong, at least for Germany and the U.K. 
And even in the case of France, where banks have clearly lost in importance in a quantitative sense, 
we cannot rejet the proposition with absolute certainty because we cannot completely rule out that 
banks there have generally been concentrating more on specific functions, or have assumed functions 
that are not reflected in our ratios. Not surprisingly, however, the kind of additional evidence discussed 
above cannot help us much further in defining exactly what the specific traditional roles of banks were 
in the three financial systems and how they might have changed. 
As noted earlier, according to the new theory of financial intermediation, one reason why banks are 
special is their ability to solve problems that arise from information asymmetries between potential 
receivers and providers of capital better than capital markets. Hence, evidence that could serve as an 
indication of the extent to which the respective banking sectors in the three financial systems fulfill that 
task would be very useful in our context. 
One can safely assume that such information asymmetries are greater for small companies than for 
larger companies. Therefore the extent to which small companies obtain finance from banks could be 
interpreted as evidence of the extent of monitoring provided by banks. A study undertaken under the 
auspices of the Banque de France examines detailed balance sheet data for the totality of French and 
German companies, and thus it can make up for one of the weaknesses of national accounts statistics, 
namely that these statistics are based on intra-sectoral aggregation.
24 The study shows that small 
German companies have been relying to a much greater extent on bank loans as a means of external 
financing than their French counterparts, and indeed that their reliance on bank loans has been 
increasing. The authors of the study conclude that the typical relationship between banks and their 
borrowers is closer in Germany than in France. They suggest that this is one important explanation for 
the fact that French small companies have to substitute bank financing with funds obtained from other 
external sources, namely equity finance and trade credit.
25 
Another study - undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (Borio 1995) - which examines 
the structure of loan markets in fourteen countries, sheds some light on the qualitative nature of a 
                                                 
24 See European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Officers: Working Group on Net Equity (1997). 
25 Other studies (Breig/Wilson 1996 and Hancké/Cieply 1996) support this assessment. They find that small 
companies rely heavily on trade credit, especially that provided by large companies. In the United Kingdom, small 
companies also face problems in obtaining adequate finance from banks; see Bank of England (1996).  
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typical British bank-borrower relationship. If one assumes that the intensity of the relationship is 
signaled by the length of time it spans (Mayer 1988), and that this length is correleated with the 
average maturity of loans (Hellwig 1991), then a longer average maturity can serve as a proxy, albeit a 
weak one, for a greater commitment on the part of both the bank and the borrower to sustain a close 
relationship. It is very interesting to note that the average maturity of loans to companies is dramatically 
shorter in the United Kingdom than in both France and Germany. Hence, the core business of British 
banks seems to be the provision of short-term finance. This might indicate a general emphasis on 
transactional banking activities. 
A third piece of evidence can be found in a paper by Bond et al. (1997), who compare the correlation 
between cash flows and investment activities of companies across countries.
26 As the authors suggest, 
the higher this correlation is, the more prevalent financial constraints will be. This in turn would imply 
greater information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers and hence would raise doubts 
concerning the existence of close bank-borrower relationships in the given financial system. The 
authors find that the correlation is significantly greater in the United Kingdom than in Germany and in 
France and consequently conclude that British banks might not have built up equally close relationships 
to their borrowers as the banks in the other two countries. 
The conclusions drawn from the additional empirical evidence quoted so far are admittedly quite 
speculative. However, this is to a large extent due to the very nature of our question concerning the 
roles of banks. At the same time, all of the evidence presented is clearly consistent in one important 
respect which is also backed up by our own results: Banks have played, and still play, very different 
roles in the three financial systems. Whereas German banks (still) seem to be engaged in relationship 
banking, especially with smaller firms, British banks have never fullfilled this function to an equivalent 
extent. Instead, they have been specialists in short term funding on an arm’s length basis.
27 Until the 
early 1980s, French banks had supposedly maintained relatively close relationships with large 
companies. As these large companies have, in the intervening years, increasingly met their financing 
needs through the capital markets, the very basis of the banks’ “specialization” seems to have eroded. 
Since their expertise in the close monitoring of smaller firms has traditionally been limited due to the old 
system of government-sponsored financing of French industry (Faugère/Voisin 1994), a dramatic loss 
of lending business has been the result. This assessment is in line with our discussion of the four 
propositions: Banking does not seem to be a declining industry in Germany and the United Kingdom; 
but bank lending seems to be a rather different business, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, in 
Germany and in Great Britain. There has nevertheless been some change in these systems, too. But it 
has had more of an impact on the institutions’ liability-side activities. French banks, on the other hand, 
                                                 
26 See Chirinko/Elston (1996) and Bond/Harhoff/van Reenen (1997) for similar approaches. 
27 This fact may also be reflected in the surprisingly small size of the British commercial paper market.  
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seem to be losing their traditional role in their asset-side business as well, and thus they may eventually 
find that the entire basis of their existence is threatened. 
5. Summary, Implications and Outlook 
In this paper we have attempted to find empirical evidence to support, or refute, the widely held belief 
that in the major European economies - Germany, France and the U.K. - the financial system, and in 
particular the financial sector, and above all the banking sector, is undergoing a process of far-reaching 
transformation, and that this process is leading to a decline in the role of banks. The research whose 
results are summarized in the paper is part of a more comprehensive project of the authors which aims 
to investigate the transformation of the European financial systems in the course of financial integration, 
a process which is generally expected to make the financial systems in European countries m ore 
similar.  
The alledged decline of the role of banks should be reflected in, and possibly also be caused by, an 
overall process of disintermediation, and in particular of disintermediation at the level of banks, and a 
concomitant trend towards securitization on a system-wide level. In terms of substance and quality, a 
possible decline of banks can be a reflection of a transition from a bank-based financial system to a 
capital market-based system, or of some other kind of structural change, or of the „simple“ fact that 
banks, or banking as an industry, are falling on hard times. 
The paper seeks to make an empirical contribution to the discussion which centers on the process of 
financial-system transformation and on the ways in which the role of banks may be changing. Based of 
the theory of financial intermediation, we develop a general framework for assessing disintermediation, 
securitization and shifts in the importance of banks, as well as specific methods of measuring all three. 
Our data base is derived from national accounts statistics for all three countries, and covers the years 
from 1982 to 1995. These statistics have been made as comparable as possible, but certain 
inconsistencies could not be eliminated. Together with the general limitations which are an outgrowth of 
the nature of these statistics - notably, the fact that they cover financial relationships only in the form of 
financial flows and claims/liabilities and that they do not report intra-sectoral financial flows and 
claims/liabilities - these inconsistencies restrict the scope of the insights which one could expect to gain 
from looking at intermediation and securitization ratios and their development over time. 
In the paper we formulate and test four propositions concerning general developments in the financial 
systems of the three countries. The first one is that there is a general tendency towards 
disintermediation. This proposition is not true at a general level, because in Germany the trend towards 
disintermediation is almost non-existent and in the United Kingdom it is not persistent. Only in France 
is the trend quite pronounced.   
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The second proposition is that there is a general tendency towards securitization. This proposition is 
largely consistent with the data for all three countries, although the respective levels of securitization, 
and their rates of increase over time, are not similar.  
The third proposition is that there is a decline in the role or importance of banks. If such a decline has 
indeed occurred in a given country, it might reflect a shift towards more financial market activity which 
may or may not affect the economic situation of the banks and the quantity and quality of financial 
services provided to the non-financial sectors by the entire financial industry; alternatively, though, it 
may merely indicate a worsening of the economic situation of the respective banking sector and a 
decline of the entire financial system. By their very construction, the intermediation and securitization 
ratios employed in our study are not suited to deciding the question of which of these two assessments 
would be called for. However, the data shows that the third proposition, like the first one, is not 
supported by the facts for the cases of Germany and the U.K., while it seems to hold in the case of 
France. Thus, it does not describe a general pattern of financial system development in Europe.  
For reasons which are explained in the paper, we think that the possibility of a simple shift from banks 
to capital markets may not be the essence of what has changed in the three systems, and in particular 
in France,where all kinds of changes are much more pronounced than in the two other countries. 
Therefore, we tested a fourth proposition which states that there is a tendency on the part of banks to 
reduce their level of activity as mobilizers of funds from the non-financial sectors more than the extent 
of their role as lenders. The data for all three countries support this proposition more than they do the 
third one. Thus, instead of a simple shift from banks to capital markets we find a trend towards 
increased specialization by banks in lending operations, with an growing portion of the function of 
mobilizing savings being left to NBFIs. As in the case of a possible transition from a bank-based to a 
market-based financial system discussed under proposition 3, this process of lengthening the 
intermediation chains might reflect an economically sound development, i.e. an increase in the efficiency 
of the entire financial system, and thus not give rise to problems for the banks in terms of profitability 
and stability for the banking sectors. Alternatively, however, it could show that the banks are under 
stress due to increasing costs of funding. The set of data which this paper employs does not permit one 
to decide which of the two alternatives constitutes the more appropriate assessment.  
Summarizing the empirical results derived from our data, the only statement which we can make 
without any reservation is that France is a special case in that its financial system shows many more - 
and much clearer and at the same time also much more volatile - signs of change than the German and 
the British systems.
28 And indeed, the overall structural stability of the German system is quite 
surprising, whereas the British system is undergoing gradual change of the kind indicated by the fourth 
                                                 
28 For a more comprehensive comparison of the French and German systems which arrives at the same result, see 
Schmidt (1997).  
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proposition. One cannot rule out the possibility that the French system is in the process of transforming 
itself from a German-style bank-based system to a capital market-based system of the Anglo-Saxon 
type. But one can also see indications that French banks are losing ground in their function as 
mobilizers of capital. However, the possibility that the French banks are simply in bad shape, and that 
they are in decline for this straightforward reason, also cannot be ruled out.  
Additional information might help to distinguish between these alternative views of what is going on in 
France, and to compare the French situation with that of the United Kingdom. This comparison might 
turn out to be more enlightening than the comparison with the German situation for various reasons. 
One is that, in the light of our statistics based on national accounts data, as well as on the basis of 
additional information, the French system is now more similar to the British one. Another reason is that 
these two systems, but not Germany’s, have undergone a wave of deregulation and reform in recent 
years. A third one is that French and British banks have fairly recently transformed themselves into 
universal banking conglomerates
29, whereas the large German banks have already been truly universal 
banks for quite some time. Thus, at least superficially, the French and the British banks seem to have 
reacted in similar ways to a similar change in their environment.  
It is interesting to note that in spite of these evident similarities, the performance of the French and 
British financial systems, and in particular that of the banking sectors of these two countries, is vastly 
different. While the profitability, and probably also the stability, of British banks is high and there does 
not seem to be the concern that important segments of the company sector encounter major problems 
in obtaining credit from the financial sector, the French banking sector exhibits a surprisingly low level 
of profitability in spite of the fact that it basically owns or controls a large part of the increasingly 
important NBFI-sector (Bertero 1994), and also signs of instability. There are also indications that the 
credit supply to the private sector leaves much to be desired in France.  
This leads one to pose the following question: What might be the reasons for such a great difference in 
the performance of the two systems in general, and of their banks in particular? We do not have the 
space in this paper to explain why we think that the reasons have much to do with the role of the state 
in the French financial system and its transformation in the 1980s which is, in turn, reflected in the way 
in which French banks failed to position themselves successfully in the market. Evidently, this question 
also has a bearing on the more general isssue of whether and how the three financial systems have 
become more similar over the course of time and whether convergence is to be expected in the near 
future. The task of investigating both of these questions must be left to future papers. 
                                                 
29 Interestingly, the British clearing banks have been reversing this trend to universal banking conglomerates in 
recent months; see Schulz (1997). This move seems to reflect their tendency to concentrate more on their core 
business which is transactional banking.  
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In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the method of measuring the role or the importance of 
banks developed in this paper has helped us tremendously to understand what has in fact happened in 
the major European financial systems and what additional information we need in order to answer the 
many questions that are still open. That the method and the data have limitations is not surprising; it is 
more surprising that these limitations do not weigh more heavily. 
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